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Summary 
In 2015, three reviews in the field of Peace and Security were under-
taken: the UN peace operations review, the review of the UN Peace-
building Architecture and the review of the implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1325. These reviews reflect the acknowledgement 
that the changing dynamics of conflict in the world necessitates a 
revision of the UN’s tools in order for the organisation to maintain its 
relevance and ability to meet these challenges. 
This report presents the key recommendations as well as common 
themes across the reviews. The common themes are: the changing 
nature of conflict; the importance of the women, peace and security 
agenda for the UN’s work; the primacy of prevention and the need for a 
long-term focus; the necessity to shift towards people-centred, inclu-
sive processes; the primacy of politics; the need for field focus and 
context awareness; the privileging of the military response to violent 
conflict is counterproductive; partnership with other actors is impor-
tant; leadership and professionalisation of the UN is needed; and a call 
for stronger UN system coherence. 
We end by offering some recommendations to the current and next 
UN Secretary-General: 
What can the current Secretary-General do: 
 Ensure that the three reviews are viewed together to ensure 
synergy and coherence.  
 Implement the lower-hanging fruits and short-term suggestions 
to ensure quick wins.  
 Keep up the momentum of the processes. Keep them on the 
agenda for the new Secretary-General without making too much 
of his own mark on processes that cannot be concluded. 
 Push for a merit-based approach regarding the selection of a 
new Secretary-General. 
 
An agenda for a new Secretary-General: 
 Reorganising the Secretariat to allow for a geographical 
approach instead of the current siloed one. 
 Changing the funding model to ensure that funding is more 
equally spread and more predictable. Much more funding is 
required for women, peace and security related activities. The 
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assessed contributions model must change so that there is not 
an automatic peacekeeping response.  
 Increasing female participation on all levels including leader-
ship is essential. 
 Modernising the Secretariat and transform it into a truly inter-
national civil service. 
 In order to succeed better at prevention, consider strengthening 
the analysis and planning capacity of the Secretariat. 
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The world is changing and United Nations peace  
operations must change with it if they are to remain an 
indispensable and effective tool in promoting 
international peace and security.1 
 
                                                          
1  UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, 31 October 2015, announcing the establish-
ment of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. 
Introduction 
2015 represented an important year for the United Nations (UN): 70 
years had passed since the signing of the UN Charter; 15 years since 
the so-called Brahimi Report on Peace Operations was launched; and 
15 years since the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on 
Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) was adopted.2 The same 
year also marked the tenth anniversary of the World Summit Outcome 
Document, which contained several important reforms of the organisa-
tion, including the establishment of the UN peacebuilding architec-
ture.3 Furthermore, 2015 was also the year in which three review 
reports in the field of UN peace and security were published – the 
report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations 
(HIPPO), the report of the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the UN 
Peacebuilding Architecture, and the Global Study report on the imple-
mentation of UNSCR 1325. These reviews were themselves a reflection 
of a growing recognition of the continued challenges faced by the UN in 
the wake of the ever changing dynamics of conflict and the resulting 
realisation that the Organisation’s prescribed tools are not fit for 
purpose.  
This policy report explores the aforementioned trio of reports and 
the review processes of which they are products: the UN peace opera-
tions review, the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the 
review of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325.4 
Key recommendations and challenges are identified, as well as com-
mon themes between the reviews, such as: institutional/organisational 
challenges (the need for greater coherence within the UN); a focus on 
political solutions (avoiding military remedies); the necessity of 
building stronger partnerships; as well as the imperative of adopting a 
people-centered, inclusive approach (incorporating, inter alia, a strong 
gender dimension), which is tailored to each individual case. We end 
the report with a list of recommendations to the current and 
forthcoming Secretary-General. 
                                                          
2  The original name of the Brahimi Report was the Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations. The Panel was chaired by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi 
of Algerie. 
3  The decision to create a UN peacebuilding architecture was made at the 2005 UN 
World Summit (see, the World Summit Outcome Document, A/RES/60/1), and the 
architecture was established by concurrent General Assembly (A/RES/60/180) and 
Security Council Resolutions (S/RES/1645) in December 2005.  
4  The policy brief is to a large extent based upon the seminar titled UN70: Peace and 
Security, held at NUPI on 26 October 2015. This was the first seminar out of three in 
the UN70 seminar series, co-organised by NUPI and the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, in connection to the UN70: A new Agenda project.  
The Three Review Processes 
The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations 
(HIPPO) 
Background 
The Brahimi Report (2000) had a significant impact on the evolution of 
peace operations in the decade following its publication. It introduced 
a number of key lessons into peacekeeping policy, for instance that the 
secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not 
what it wants to hear; that the UN should not deploy peacekeepers 
where there is no peace to keep; and that mandates would have to be 
matched with the requisite resources.  
In 2008 the UN published a comprehensive document, the so-called 
‘Capstone Doctrine’, outlining principles and guidelines for its peace-
keeping operations. This was based largely on the existing principles of 
peacekeeping: consent, impartiality and limited use of force. It also 
enshrined recommendations of the Brahimi Report as well as lessons 
drawn from more recent peacekeeping experience. However, half a 
decade later it was acknowledged that there is an emerging gap 
between the established UN peacekeeping doctrine and many of the 
current missions that take place amidst on-going conflicts, revealing 
the limitations of the doctrine in confronting the increasingly complex 
conflicts of the contemporary world.5  
Hence, on 31 October 2014, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
announced the establishment of the 17-member High-level Indepen-
dent Panel on Peace Operations, which was to be chaired by President 
Jose Ramos-Horta of Timor-Leste.6 After a six-month extensive consul-
tation process, the Panel presented its report on 16 June 20157 and the 
                                                          
5  Peter, Mateja (2015) Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping 
Dilemma. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organi-
zations: July-September 2015, 21(3), pp. 351-370; Karslrud, John (2015) The UN at 
war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN 
peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. Third World Quarterly, 
36(1), pp. 40-54 
6  The panel consisted of the following persons (in addition to Ramos-Horta): Jean 
Arnault, Marie-Louise Baricako, Radhika Coomaraswamy, Abhijit Guha, Andrew 
Hughes, Alexander Ilitchev, Hilde F. Johnson, Youssef Mahmoud, Ian Martin, 
Henrietta Joy Abena Nyarko Mensa-Bonsu, B. Lynn Pascoe, Floriano Peixoto Vieira 
Neto, Rima Salah and Wang Xuexian. Bruce Jones was originally appointed but 
withdrew. 
7  The Peace Operations report: 
http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf 
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UN Secretary General presented his implementation report on 2 Sep-
tember 2015.8 
In addition to the perceived need to reform peace operations in 
order for them to fit and address contemporary challenges to peace and 
security, the need to contribute to a consensus concerning the use of 
force in peace operations and the need to strengthen the UN’s credibil-
ity amongst the people directly affected by the operations, were also 
underlying aspirations of the review process. It was believed that for 
the UN to last another 70 years change is imperative.  
Key Recommendations  
The key recommendations made in the HIPPO report constitute four 
shifts in the way the UN thinks and acts in connection to peace opera-
tions.  
The first shift is that politics needs to drive the type of intervention 
that is chosen in each case. In other words, there is a need to move 
away from the template-driven deployment of nearly identical multi-
dimensional peace operations into conflict areas, with very little con-
cern for the specific circumstances of each case.  
The particular political situation of the country or area into which 
the UN is to deploy must form the starting point for planning and con-
figuration of peace operations. What type of intervention is needed to 
solve the conflict and sustain peace in each circumstance? It is not 
always necessary or helpful to deploy thousands of troops. Sometimes 
a much lighter and fine-tuned response could be more relevant and 
effective. The report envisages a spectrum of responses, from light 
teams of country experts as a preventive measure in emerging conflicts, 
to operations with a different political set-up than the current one when 
crises have exploded, and continued political presence after the peace 
operation has left the country in addition to a development-focused 
country team. Light teams can thus also play a role in the aftermath of 
conflict in order to prevent relapse.  
Moreover, the report suggests the scale-up of peace and develop-
ment advisors in the UN country teams, which may prove critical for 
analysing what is needed politically and for alerting headquarters.9 
Linked to the thinking around which type of intervention is required is 
the issue of exit strategy. Future operations must be based on clear 
formulations of what constitute success or sufficient change for the UN 
to scale-down or withdraw its presence in the particular case.  This 
                                                          
8  The UNSG implementation report: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/357.   
9 A/70/95- S/2015/446, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Opera-
tions: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people, 17 June 
2015, para 75. 
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requires more reflection on when and how peace can be sustained 
without outside assistance. 
The current funding system is not tailored to privilege the political 
aspect of UN interventions. Political missions are not funded by the 
assessed contributions – only peacekeeping missions are. There has 
therefore been a need to secure ad-hoc funding from supportive donors 
for such initiatives. A new system, which secures predictable funding, 
is therefore a prerequisite for this suggested shift.  
The second proposed shift is towards the flexible use of peace opera-
tions to respond to changes on the ground. In order to achieve such 
flexibility there is a need to change the mandate design-system, so that 
the mandate process becomes sequenced and adaptive to the context 
on the ground. By introducing a two-step process one avoids the pro-
blems that result from a rushed mandate, which is not fit for purpose. 
The pressure to do something visible and fast when a crisis erupts may 
motivate the deployment of a large amount of blue helmets, even if that 
is not the right response to the problem at hand. And due to path 
dependency the mistakes made at the outset tend to haunt the mission 
for its duration.  
A two-stage mandate process, in which there is an initial interim 
deployment for the first six months (stage one), makes time for a solid 
analysis of the conflict dynamics and a thorough assessment of 
logistical and other needs, before an appropriately calibrated mission is 
deployed at the second stage – be it a light team focusing on a political 
problem or a multi-dimensional operation. The interim deployment 
would be aimed at stabilising the situation and could be done in 
partnership with, for example, the African Union (AU). In such circum-
stances, the UN would fund the AU operation. This approach would 
also allow time to ensure ownership by the host country through the 
drafting of a compact between it and the UN. Moreover, it would allow 
time for consultations with the troop contributing countries, which is 
often not the case under the current system.   
This takes us to the third shift, namely towards building stronger, 
more inclusive peace and security partnerships. As argued in the 
report, there is presently a considerable challenge connected to the 
division of labour that has evolved over time whereby some member 
states tend to fund operations and some contribute the troops. This has 
caused tension between the two categories of member states. There is 
also friction between the Security Council and the troop contributing 
countries, as the former are seen to be pushing for operations that the 
troop contributors feel are too high-risk. Additionally, the legitimacy 
and the faith in the success of a mission may be harmed due to lack of 
P5 troop contributions.  
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UN peace operations are nowadays mostly deployed into areas 
where there is no peace to keep. More work is therefore needed on 
deciding how and when to use force. The report says in very explicit 
terms that that the panel believes that UN peacekeeping missions are 
not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations.10 The 
report offers a list of seven considerations in this regard.11 When it 
comes to protection of civilians, the report is adamant that the UN has 
to deliver proactively and robustly. However, capabilities and resources 
need to be matched with the mandate in order to do so. Current opera-
tions are under-resourced for this purpose and often ill-fitted to geogra-
phical and climatic conditions as well as to logistical requirements.  
The fourth shift towards people oriented and field focused opera-
tions, requires serious reforms. With the hasty deployment of big inter-
ventions, people in the recipient societies often feel that the peace 
operations are not there for their benefit.12 It is therefore recommended 
that more consultative processes are put in place, in which UN staff, 
mission leadership etc. consult with the host society, not only on a 
governmental level, but on a much broader societal level, ensuring the 
active involvement of a diverse set of actors from the grassroots up.13 
This requires a change of mind-set as well as a change to the system.  
In order to contribute to sustaining peace the UN has to move away 
from the state-centric, blueprint-focused and technically oriented 
approach. A field- and people-oriented approach is needed.  
There is also a need to bring the field-oriented nature of UN peace 
operations into recruitment processes. The current system for recruit-
ment, it is argued, was developed for appointing people to head-
quarters in New York and Geneva, and is not suitable for recruiting 
thousands of people to work in the field. It is too time consuming and 
complicated, and thus slows down the process to a detrimental degree. 
It is also not geared towards identifying the right person for the job in 
terms of relevant expertise, but emphasises instead rank and hierarchy. 
A shift towards field-oriented recruitment also has consequences for 
                                                          
10  A/70/95- S/2015/446, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Ope-
rations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people, 17 
June 2015, para 119. 
11  A/70/95- S/2015/446, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Ope-
rations: on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people, 17 
June 2015, para 116. 
12  de Coning, Cedric (2013) Understanding Peacebuilding as Essentially Local. Stabil-
ity, 2(1): 6, pp. 1-6, Jennings, Kathleen M. & Morten Bøås (2015) Transactions and 
Interactions: Everyday Life in the Peacekeeping Economy, Journal of Intervention 
and Statebuilding, 9(3), 281-295. 
13  See also, de Coning, C. Karlsrud, J & Troost, P. 2015. Towards More People-Centric 
Peace Operations: From ‘Extension of State Authority’ to ‘Strengthening Inclusive 
State-Society Relations’. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 
4(1): 49, pp. 1–13. 
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the structure of the secretariat. The report suggests moving the 
responsibility for recruitment for field positions to the Department of 
Field Support. 
Let us now take a closer look at the recommendations made in the 
Report of the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the Peace Building 
Architecture.   
The Review of the UN Peace Building Architecture14 
Background 
The UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) was established in 2005 and 
consists of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding 
Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).15  In line 
with the provisions in the founding resolutions,16 the PBA was 
reviewed five years after its establishment. The recommendations of 
that review did not, however, have a significant impact. This was per-
haps due to the design of the process, with its fairly narrow participa-
tion. The 10-year review, which is the topic for this paper, was 
designed with a view to ensuring broad participation. There was a con-
sultative process amongst the members of the PBC in order to establish 
the review’s terms of reference. The review itself consists of a two-stage 
process with broad consultations with different constituencies at both 
stages: First, an Advisory Group of Experts, consisting of seven persons 
appointed by the Secretary-General, produced a report with recommen-
dations, based on research and analysis of a large amount of 
background material as well as consultations with various stakeholders 
and civil society actors.17 Their report was presented on 29 June 2015. 
The second stage, which is still on-going, consists of an intergovern-
mental process lead by Australia and Angola. This will consider the 
recommendations made by the AGE and will probably lead to a reso-
lution in March 2016 when Angola chairs the Security Council.18 
The scope of the 10-year review is not only the institutions estab-
lished in 2005 – the PBC, the PBF and the PBSO. Rather, the Peace-
building Architecture is understood in broader terms as also including 
                                                          
14  The Peacebuilding Architecture report: 
http://www.un.org/ga/president/64/issues/pbc/PBCReport.pdf 
15  The PBA was established by concurrent General Assembly (A/RES/60/180) and 
Security Council Resolutions (S/RES/1645) in December 2005.  
16   Para 27. 
17  This group consisted of the following experts: Anis Bajwa, Saraswathi Menon, 
Funmi Olonisakin, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Charles Petrie, Gert Rosenthal and 
Edith Grace Ssempala. 
18  For an overview of Security Council Presidency, see: 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/presidency/  
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the wider system for UN peacebuilding.19 This is based on the acknow-
ledgement that: 
the shortcomings in efforts to fill “the gaping hole” in the UN’s insti-
tutional machinery for building peace are systemic in nature. They 
result from a generalized misunderstanding of the nature of peace-
building, and, even more, from the fragmentation of the UN into 
separate “silos”.20 
Key Recommendations  
The starting point for the assessment of the PBA is the changing global 
context for conflict and peacebuilding, in which more complex, frag-
mented and increasingly intractable civil conflicts are on the rise. The 
drivers of violence both new and longstanding, put demands on the UN 
to rethink the way it seeks to move beyond conflict. The UN has been 
slow to adapt to the changing nature of conflict, largely due to the way 
the UN system is set up, with its organisational and bureaucratic con-
straints. The prioritising of peacekeeping in the funding system means 
that the organisation has been weak on peacebuilding and preventive 
measures. It has tended to deal with the symptoms, not the root causes 
of conflict. Moreover, the large UN peacekeeping operations consume 
so many resources that there has not been enough time and energy 
dedicated to other peacebuilding responses. The AGE report therefore 
suggests two shifts in thinking and action.  
The first is a shift away from a narrow understanding of peace-
building, where the aim is to avoid ae relapse into violent conflict, to an 
understanding that entails sustaining peace. In this way one leaves 
behind the predominantly post-conflict focus of peacebuilding, and 
under_stands it as a more comprehensive enterprise where also preven-
tion – controversial as it is due to perceived interventionism– is 
included. It is argued that the separation between preventive and post-
conflict measures is artificial, since many of the tools and resources 
required are similar.21 By introducing the concept of sustaining peace, 
the AGE also links peacebuilding to the current thinking around deve-
lopment, as the Sustainable Development Goal 16 focuses on the pro-
motion of just, peaceful and inclusive societies in order to achieve 
sustained levels of peace.22 While the importance of building resilient 
institutions is highlighted in the report, the political nature of peace-
building is emphasised: 
                                                          
19 In this way it could be viewed as a conceptual review of how we define peace-
building, as well. 
20  The Challenge of Sustaining Peace, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 
2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, p. 7. 
21  Ibid, paragraph 26. 
22  See http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/post-2015-
development-agenda/goal-16.html. 
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While capacity building, state building, institution building and 
development all demand considerable technical expertise, first and 
foremost peacebuilding must be understood as an inherently 
political process.23 
With this shift, the set of responses that have hitherto been seen as 
belonging to different stages of the conflict life cycle – prevention, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding24 – would be inte-
grated into one concept that would unite the peace and security, 
human rights and development pillars of the UN. It would represent a 
new conceptual development, which would necessitate a radical 
change in how the UN goes about its business. It would demand an end 
to the siloed responses where different department, agencies and funds 
specialise in particular areas and may work in conflict with each other. 
In relation to this it is envisaged that the PBC could act as a bridge 
between the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the 
General Assembly. This necessitates a deepened commitment from the 
Security Council, in particular. It should regularly request and draw 
upon advice from the PBC, and consider passing on countries on its 
agenda to the PBC when peace consolidation has sufficiently pro-
gressed. A strengthened and upgraded PBSO is also seen as necessary.  
The report underscores the importance of realistic timelines for the 
success of UN peace operations, other peacebuilding engagements and 
development assistance. A preoccupation with the cessation of hostili-
ties, hurried peace agreements, and the hasty execution of mandates 
that prioritise elections has proven to be counterproductive. Instead the 
focus must be on addressing the root causes of the conflict,25 inter alia 
through national dialogue processes, and building legitimate and 
resilient institutions. This takes a long time – often a generation.26 A 
new mind-set, acceptance and patience, is therefore required.  Part of 
this is also an attention to, and management of, the transition between 
different forms of UN engagement. The continuity of leadership when 
the nature of the engagement changes (for example, from a UN country 
team to a mission or vice versa), is seen as critical in order to move 
away from siloed responses.  
                                                          
23  Ibid, paragraph 7. 
24  Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace (1992) was instrumental in this 
understanding. Note, however, that his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace 
(A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995), published three years later, argued for a 
more comprehensive understanding. Such an understanding was also acknow-
ledged by the Security Council in January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/5, 20 February 
2001). Nevertheless, the Security Council’s agenda item continues to be labelled 
‘post-conflict peacebuilding’. 
25  On this, see also Cedric de Coning & Eli Stamnes, UN Peacebuilding Architecture: 
The First 10 Years (New York: Routledge, 2016).  
26  The Challenge of Sustaining Peace, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 
2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, para 
30. 
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The second shift proposed in the AGE report is one towards a focus 
on fostering inclusive national ownership. National ownership has tra-
ditionally been taken to mean the acceptance by, or inclusion of, the 
national government in decisions related to the peacebuilding process 
in order to avoid charges of imposing measures from the outside. 
Governments, however, can be authoritarian and are often not 
representative of the whole society in conflict-ridden states. Therefore, 
the AGE report argues for inclusive national ownership, involving a 
broad range of actors, such as political opposition, labour organisa-
tions, political parties, civil society and minorities in addition to the 
government. The inclusion of women and youth is emphasised in this 
context. Whereas peace processes so far have tended to privilege the 
belligerent parties, an inclusive process would bring in grass root 
actors who are engaged in peacebuilding activities and other peaceful 
agents for positive change. The constructive role women can play in 
ending violence and sustaining peace is highlighted here.  
The AGE report emphasises that peace cannot be imposed from the 
outside. A real inclusive process would ensure that the responsibility 
for the efforts to sustain peace is shared by all key social strata and 
divides of the society itself. The UN’s role would therefore be to enable 
a variety of actors to play their role, not to act in their place.  
The UN must also work in partnership with outside actors. The 
challenge of sustaining peace requires the involvement of international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund as well as regional and sub-regional organisations, e.g. 
the African Union. The AGE report recommends closer strategic and 
operational partnerships with these actors, emphasising that this 
should be prioritised. 
The need for more predictable funding for peacebuilding is 
highlighted. In addition to the pooling of funding with international 
financial institutions and other multilateral and bilateral donors, the 
report also argues for a change in the UN funding system. The PBF, per-
haps the most successful element of the PBA, should be enabled to play 
to its comparative advantage as a rapid, impactful, procedurally light, 
risk-taking investor by receiving 1% of the UN’s assessed contributions 
or 100 million US dollars (whichever is higher) annually. Moreover, it 
is suggested that the assessed contributions are also used for the pro-
grammatic dimensions of peace operations mandates.   
Let us now turn to the third review discussed here, the Global Study 
on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. 
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The Review of the Implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325 
Background 
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) was passed in 2000 
as the culmination of a process set in motion by women’s NGOs and the 
backing of supportive member states. It was partly a response to a 
decade of peacekeeping failures in Africa and the Balkans, which had 
underlined the limitations of UN operations in dealing with widespread 
sexual and gender-based violence. 
The resolution represented a historic landmark in that it made gen-
der a matter of international peace and security, acknowledged the dif-
ferential effects of armed conflicts on men and women, and addressed 
the lack of inclusion of women in broader peacebuilding efforts. After 
SCR 1325, six additional resolutions on various aspects of this topic 
followed in its wake.27 All these resolutions are the subject of the 
review process, which was initiated by Security Council resolution 
2122.28 This resolution invited the Secretary-General to commission a 
global study and convene a high-level panel to assess the progress in 
implementing SCR 1325 on the international, regional and national 
levels.29 The ten-year review, conducted in 2010, had found the imple-
mentation to be very weak, uneven and under-resourced, and in SCR 
2122 the Security Council remained 
deeply concerned about persistent implementation deficits in the 
women, peace and security agenda, including in: protection from 
human rights abuses and violations; opportunities for women to 
exercise leadership; resources provided to address their needs and 
which will help them exercise their rights; and the capacities and 
commitment of all actors involved in the implementation of reso-
lution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions to advance women’s 
participation and protection.30 
The subsequent Global study was led by Radhika Coomaraswamy, 
former SRSG on Children and Armed Conflict and former Special Rap-
porteur on Violence Against Women. A High-level advisory group of 17 
experts was appointed to provide guidance for the study and to provide 
feedback on its policy recommendations.31 Extensive consultations 
                                                          
27  Security Council Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1969, 2106, 2122. In October 
2015 resolution 2242 was passed. This was in part based on the findings and 
recommendations of the Global Study.  
28  S/RES/2122/2013, 18 October 2013. 
29  S/RES/2122/2013, 18 October 2013, para. 16. 
30  S/RES/2122/2013, 18 October 2013, preamble, pp. 1-2. 
31  In addition to Coomaraswamy, the panel consisted of Patrick Cammaert, Anwarul 
Chowdhury, Liliana Andrea Silva Bello, Sharon Bhagwan Rolls, Leymah Gbowee, 
Julia Kharashvili, Youssef Mahmoud, Luz Mendez, Alaa Murabit, Ruth Ochieng, 
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were held with diverse groups of stakeholders and focus groups; 
country visits were conducted in addition to commissioned research, 
an online portal for exchanging views, and a civil society survey. The 
resulting 480 page long report, the Global Study: Preventing Conflict, 
Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, launched 14 October 2015, 
highlights good practice, gaps, emergent threats and challenges.  
The report is very comprehensive in scope and offers concrete 
recommendations after each chapter as well as a set of general recom-
mendations. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all chapters 
in depth. The key recommendations are, however, outlined below. 
Key Recommendations 
The findings of the Global Study demonstrate the substantial 
challenges that remain in implementing SCR 1325. There have, for 
instance, been very few prosecutions in connection to sexual violence 
in conflict.32 Despite the existence of a strong normative framework, 
little has changed on the ground.33 There are also persistent challenges 
with regard to the implementation of 1325 in the fields of peacemaking 
and peacekeeping. According to the report, the rates of women’s parti-
cipation in formal peace processes are very low (9% in 2010), albeit 
slowly rising. In peace operations, only 3% of military staff are women, 
and most of them work as support staff. Only 28% of UN member states 
have national action plans for implementation of 1325, and these are 
process-oriented rather than focusing on concrete measurable out-
puts.34 Very rarely there are actual budgetary allocations for its imple-
mentation, and there are few accountability mechanisms in place.  
The new and emergent challenges in world politics have not made 
the situation any easier. The rise of violent extremism, which is given 
much importance in the report, threatens women’s lives and leads to a 
cycle of militarisation of societies. Militarisation has been proven to 
have an adverse effect on women’s security. It also put women peace-
builders in an ambivalent position as the rise of violent extremism in 
their societies means that the are working in increasingly dangerous 
                                                          
Pramila Patten, Bandana Rana, Madeleine Rees, Elisabeth Rehn, Igballe Rogova 
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January 2015.  
32  Skjelsbæk, Inger (2012) Responsibility to Protect or Prevent? Victims and Perpetrat-
ors of Sexual Violence Crimes in Armed Conflicts, Global Responsibility to Protect 
4(2): pp. 154–171. 
33  Tryggestad, Torunn L. (2009) Trick or Treat? The UN and Implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, Global Governance 15(4): 
pp. 539–557; Tryggestad, Torunn L. (2014) International Norms and Political 
Change: 'Women, Peace and Security' and the UN Security Agenda. PhD thesis, Fac-
ulty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Oslo. 
34  Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, 14 
October 2015, p. 15. 
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environments while counter-terrorism policies place restraints on their 
work and restrict their access to critical funds and resources”.35 
Finally, despite considerable rhetorical support for the women, 
peace and security agenda and the norms established, not much has 
changed in terms of the abysmally poor funding situation – only 2% of 
peace and security funding and 6% of bilateral aid goes to addressing 
gender issues. 
Based on the findings, the Global Study report offers ten recommen-
dations:36 
1. No to militarisation, yes to prevention. All other means must be 
exhausted before resorting to military force. 
2. The women, peace and security agenda must be respected as a 
human rights mandate. The agenda should never be ‘securi-
tised’. Women’s agency must be respected, and their autonomy 
prioritised.  
3. Mediators of peace processes and leadership of UN field missi-
ons must be proactive with regard to women’s participation. 
Such participation makes peace sustainable. 
4. Perpetrators must be punished and justice must be transforma-
tive. Impunity must come to an end and various reconciliation 
efforts are important after intense warfare.  
5. Localisation of peacebuilding programmes must involve women 
at every level and be supplemented by a comprehensive secur-
ity plan to protect women and girls in the aftermath of conflict. 
Peacebuilding processes must respect the local context and 
women’s participation is crucial for them to be sustainable. 
Without a Rule of Law system violence against women intensi-
fies.  
6. Funding women peacebuilders and respecting their autonomy 
is one important way of countering extremism. There is a corre-
lation between women’s rights and a lack of extremism in soci-
ety. Women peacebuilders have a better understanding of local 
realities and expectations and are thus best equipped to fight 
for their rights.  
                                                          
35  Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, 14 
October 2015, p 224. 
36  Global Study: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, 14 
October 2015, pp. 394-396. 
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7. All key actors must play their role. Member states, regional 
organisations, media, civil society and youth must all do their 
part to promote and implement the women, peace and security 
agenda.  
8. It is crucial to move towards a well-informed Security Council 
that applies a gender lens to all issues that come before it. An 
informal expert group should be created in order to sustain the 
attention to the women, peace and security agenda.  
9. Across the board, 15% of all peace and security funding should 
be earmarked for programmes impacting women. There is a 
need to address the persistent failure to adequately fund the 
women, peace and security agenda. 
10. It is necessary to build a stronger gender architecture at the 
United Nations. The women, peace and security agenda should 
be made a priority in the field and at headquarters, through a 
variety of measures.  
The report ends with a call to action. Women play important roles as 
peacemakers and peacebuilders, but are often rendered invisible and 
unnoticed. Attention must therefore be turned to these crucial women, 
to the support and funding of their efforts, so that they can develop and 
build upon existing local, regional and international networks in order 
to stem militarisation and mindless violence. 
Coherence between the Reports 
Introduction 
In terms of the process leading up to the reports, there are differences 
in the working methods of each review. However, one important simi-
larity is that the work of all three included substantial consultations 
with a variety of actors, albeit to varying degrees. This is an important 
signal for similar processes in the future, and reflects the value put on 
broad consultation in all three reports.  
The HIPPO report, the AGE report and the Global Study report are all 
bold in the sense that they make recommendations aiming to change 
the UN system in fairly radical ways. However, one could also argue 
that on some points, they are far from radical. They are simply aiming 
to narrow the gap between policy and practice so the UN can be better 
equipped to deal with current challenges. 
In order to avoid discrepancies becoming excuses for rejecting 
change, it has been seen as important that the three processes work in 
harness together and in particular that there are no contradictions 
between the recommendations made in each of the reviews. An aware-
ness of this has been evident throughout the processes, in that there 
have been consultations between the HIPPO and the AGE; members of 
each panel have been present in common consultations; and through 
the appointment of Radhika Coomaraswamy and Youssef Mahmoud to 
both the HIPPO and the Global Study panels.  
However, in order to gather institutional and member state support 
for the proposed changes, it is also important not to give the impression 
to the member states that the three reviews constitute a take-it-or-leave-
it package. As such, one should not underestimate the importance of 
letting the different committees and member states go through the vari-
ous recommendations and pick some low-hanging fruits. 
The fact that the three reviews follow different tracks and are to be 
implemented by different institutions may reinforce this. Nevertheless, 
this very same fact also highlights the siloes that are so characteristic of 
the UN. In order to seek to mitigate this, the Office of the President of 
the General Assembly has taken the initiative of organising a high-level 
thematic debate of the General Assembly in May 2016, providing a 
platform to reflect on ways to draw out synergies from these three 
reviews. Ahead of the meeting, a series of consultations will be 
conducted, seeking to identify key common themes and set a future 
reform agenda.  
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Common themes across the reports 
When it comes to the substantive coherence between the reports, the 
following themes are highlighted in all of them: 
The changing nature of conflict  
The changing global context for conflict and peacebuilding forms the 
backdrop for all the reports.37 This includes the rise of violent extrem-
ism, sexual targeting of women and children, challenges arising from 
transnational networks fostering illicit trade, weapons proliferation, 
etc. The implications of the changing nature of conflict for the civilian 
population, including women and girls, are highlighted, together with 
the need for the UN to change it modus operandi in order to address 
these changes.  
The importance of the women, peace and security agenda for the UN’s 
work 
Both the HIPPO report and the AGE report deal with SCR 1325 at 
length.38 The particular impact on, and needs of women and girls in 
violent conflict are highlighted, so also the need for increased female 
participation at all levels, including leadership. HIPPO and the Global 
Study emphasises the need to mainstream gender sensitive analyses 
into the UN’s work. Gender expertise at headquarters and in the field is 
addressed in both the HIPPO report and the Global Study, while the 
AGE echoes the Global Study in proposing the 15% ‘gender marker’ for 
funding of gender equality measures.39 Finally, there is also agreement 
between all three reports, that women’s involvement is crucial for 
sustaining peace. 
The primacy of prevention and the need for a long-term focus 
Prevention is a controversial issue amongst UN member states, as some 
fear that it can be used as a pretext for undue involvement in their 
internal affairs. Nevertheless, the HIPPO report, the AGE report and the 
Global Study all argue that prevention must be prioritised in order to 
build lasting peace.40 The HIPPO report shows that a preventive 
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response may only require a light form of intervention, and the AGE 
reports makes the case for doing away with the idea of a conflict life 
cycle in which preventive measures are restricted to the pre-conflict 
phase. According to the AGE, with a focus on sustaining peace, a pre-
ventive mind-set is central, uniting the peace and security, human 
rights and development pillars of the UN. The Global study on its part, 
sees prevention as a way of avoiding militarisation, and argues that 
military means should only be used as a last resort.  
Shifting towards people-centred, inclusive processes  
As an organisation made up of states, the UN has tended to deal with 
governments and heads of states. To the extent that local ownership 
has been sought, this has been taken to mean ownership by the govern-
ment of the state in question. However, governments are not necessar-
ily representative of its citizens and may even be a major part of the 
problems sought solved. Hence, all three reports argue for a shift away 
from this towards more consultative engagement and the involvement 
of broad sections of the society in which the UN operates. The partici-
pation of women as active agents of peacebuilding, youth, opposition 
and minorities are highlighted in this context.41 Such inclusivity would 
lead to real, broad-based ownership and responsibility of the process of 
sustaining peace. The UN’s primary job in this would be to play a more 
facilitative role, enabling and ensuring the participation of a variety of 
actors.  
The primacy of politics  
Connected to the point above is the shared claim that peacebuilding 
must be understood as an inherently political process. The UN’s 
responses have tended to deal with the symptoms of violent conflict 
and act as a ‘band-aid’. All three reports argue the need to deal with 
root causes and structural drivers of conflict instead.42 There is 
acknowledgement that such an approach would be much more long-
term oriented than current engagements. 
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The need for field focus and context awareness  
All three reports argue that the UN needs to pay more attention to the 
context in which it deploys measures of any kind.43 Currently there is a 
lack of attention to the real needs and conflict dynamics on the ground, 
includeing gender dynamics. Mandates tend to be designed around a 
template, which privileges big, multidimensional interventions. 
Instead of this one-size-fits-all approach, arguments are made for 
tailored and flexible engagement suited to each individual case. In the 
case of the Global Study in particular, context awareness is also seen to 
involve attention to the gendered dimensions of crises. The need for 
fine-tuned and better responses would require substantial changes to 
the planning process, to the skills of personnel involved, as well as to 
the institutional set-up. 
The privileging of the military response to violent conflict is counter-
productive  
All three reports offer a critique of the current privileging of huge, mili-
tary-heavy peace operations. 44 The current financing system favours 
this response to crisis and conflict, and this is exaggerated by the 
imperative to be seen to act quickly and decisively. All three reports see 
the UN’s preoccupation with militarised solutions as an obstacle to last-
ing peace and something that needs to change. The Global Study is 
very explicit with regard to the fact that militarised solutions, and the 
resulting militarisation of society, are detrimental to women’s security. 
This is a claim that is based on a solid body of research.  
Partnership with other actors  
Both the HIPPO and the AGE reports emphasise the importance of part-
nering up with regional organisations, such as the AU, sub-regional 
organisations and financial institutions.45 In particular in the AGE 
report, there is an emphasis on economic, strategic partnerships. The 
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Global Study highlight local, regional and international grass-root 
networks as important agents for change.  
Leadership and professionalisation of the UN  
Both the HIPPO and the AGE reports argue for the increased profes-
sionalisation of the UN. This implies recruitment based on merit and 
relevant expertise rather than rank and hierarchy, including for the 
new UN Secretary-General. It also implies the need to bring the field-
oriented nature of UN peace operations into recruitment processes, 
making them suitable for recruiting thousands of people to work in the 
field. Greater professionalisation is associated with accountability:  
holding UN personnel properly accountable for their acts, including 
sexual abuse.46  
UN system coherence  
In different ways all reports argue for more integration and system 
coherence: Greater inter-governmental coherence, greater commitment 
and involvement from the Security Council, greater coordination 
between three pillars human rights, development and peace and 
security.47 
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Concluding remarks – the way 
forward  
The policy implications of the HIPPO report, the AGE report and the 
Global Study are wide-ranging. In conclusion of this synthesis report 
we suggest the following list of tasks for the current and next UN Secre-
tary-General. 
What can the current Secretary-General do: 
 Ensure that the three reviews are viewed together to ensure syn-
ergy and coherence.  
 Implement the lower-hanging fruits and short-term suggestions 
to ensure quick wins.  
 Keep up the momentum of the processes. Keep them on the 
agenda for the new Secretary-General without making too much 
of his own mark on processes that cannot be concluded. 
 Push for a merit-based approach regarding the selection of a 
new Secretary-General. 
An agenda for a new Secretary-General: 
 Reorganising the Secretariat to allow for a geographical 
approach instead of the current siloed one. 
 Changing the funding model to ensure that funding is more 
equally spread and more predictable. Much more funding is 
required for women, peace and security related activities. The 
assessed contributions model must change so that there is not 
an automatic peacekeeping response.  
 Increasing female participation on all levels including leader-
ship is essential. 
 Modernising the Secretariat and transform it into a truly inter-
national civil service. 
 In order to succeed better at prevention, consider strengthening 
the analysis and planning capacity of the Secretariat. 
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